Nabokov's Case Against Natural Selection
Nitin Ahuja (Harvard)
Despite the apparent
pleasure he derived from the obscurity of his scientific specialty,
Vladimir Nabokov is well-known for his simultaneous interest in
literature and Lepidoptera, having made independently significant
contributions to both fields. Given his isolation and exaltation
of these “two pleasures” as “the most intense
known to man,” one is naturally led to wonder whether some
correlation exists between them, or more specifically, how Nabokov’s
methods and precepts in one pursuit might have influenced his
work in the other (Strong Opinions, 3). In particular, Nabokov’s
long-maintained refutation of natural selection, an idiosyncrasy
underscored by the current entrenchment of Darwinian theory in
modern thought, invites such speculation. It is essential to note
that Nabokov’s challenge to natural selection was backed
by empirical observation and scientifically justifiable in light
of available evidence. Still, one may easily discern, at varying
depths and intensities, echoes of the elements of Nabokov’s
anti-Darwinian argument in his fiction. Such intersections suggest
that there exists a meaningful correlation between his scientific
views and artistic inclinations, both of which may then be further
illuminated.
Nabokov’s
expressed rejections of natural selection are generally rooted
in his belief that the theory does not fully account for the observed
intricacy and sophistication of the natural world. In this regard
Nabokov most often highlights the phenomenon of animal mimicry
and the extreme degree to which it is often refined: “‘Natural
selection,’ in the Darwinian sense, could not explain the
miraculous coincidence of imitative aspect and imitative behavior,
nor could one appeal to the theory of ‘the struggle for
life’ when a protective device was carried to a point of
mimetic subtlety, exuberance, and luxury far in excess of a predator’s
power of appreciation” (Speak, Memory, 125). Nabokov doubts
the need for selective pressure to function on such a painstaking
scale, so as to produce, for example, “markings mimicking
grub-bored holes” on a butterfly’s leaf-like wings
(Speak, Memory, 125). Thus on a scientific level Nabokov argues
that the Darwinian model of evolutionary selection is reductive,
the posited mechanism being too rudimentary to have produced all
of nature’s “fantastic twists and tints” (Strong
Opinions, 334).
To explain the
resultant stylistic surplus of the natural world, Nabokov looks
to what he perceives to be its dominant function, his own pleasure.
Nabokov sensibly refrains from including such conjecture in his
scientific discourse, but elsewhere repeatedly implies that the
natural flourish was, at its inception, intended specifically
for human enjoyment. This notion yields in turn the suggestion
of conscious oversight by “some waggish artist” whose
creative labors in nature are meant “precisely for the intelligent
eyes of man” (The Gift, 109). Natural details like the mimicking
of ‘grub-bored holes’ may be seen as calling cards
of this distant creator, playfully subtle signatures meant to
evoke appreciation among careful observers. Amidst his ecstatic
appreciation of a natural landscape, therefore, Nabokov feels
obligated to honor its putative author: “A thrill of gratitude
to whom it may concern – to the contrapuntal genius of human
fate or to tender ghosts humoring a lucky mortal” (Speak,
Memory, 139). Similarly, he senses in his own composition a supernatural
stroke: “Neither in environment nor in heredity can I find
the exact instrument that fashioned me, the anonymous roller that
pressed upon my life a certain intricate watermark” (Speak,
Memory, 25). In both cases an excess of splendor leads Nabokov
to suspect its conscious origin.
Understandably,
many commentators are quick to defend Nabokov’s objection
to natural selection by highlighting the contextual legitimacy
and scientific rigor of his claims. For example, while the current
breadth of empirical evidence in support of the Darwinian model
is staggering, much of this reinforcement was achieved in the
past few decades; as Dieter Zimmer writes, “at the time
when Nabokov developed his refutation of natural selection, Darwinian
theory was far more open to doubt and discussion than it is today”
(Zimmer, 49). Furthermore, as a taxonomist, Nabokov would have
been somewhat removed from the evolutionary biology work of even
his own day (Pyle, 65). As he knew it, natural selection was still
nascent theory, and it is therefore logical that he would consider
it vulnerable to criticism.
Additional justification of Nabokov’s views is given by
the science with which he backed them. Notably, he accepted “evolution
as a modal formula”; his contention is expressly targeted
at the notion of selective pressure and random mutation as its
driving forces (Nabokov’s Butterflies, 356). Although he
could not provide a measure of predatorial perception, his claim
that mimetic phenomena exceed such discernment is based on observation
and was, as Zimmer notes, “not at all unreasonable”
(Zimmer, 50). Similarly, he includes in an early lepidopteral
paper an independent argument regarding the unlikelihood of so
many rapid evolutionary advancements occurring at random and in
tandem: “repetitions of structure…cannot be treated
as a result of haphazard ‘convergence’ since the number
of coincident characters in one element…exceeds anything
that might be produced by chance” (Nabokov’s Butterflies,
356). This challenge, too, has since been resolved by evolutionary
biologists, but is again reflective of the scientific attention
with which Nabokov developed his claim (Zimmer, 55).
Yet while a contextualization
of Nabokov’s perspective is necessary, efforts to further
quarantine Nabokov’s anti-Darwinian stance by suggesting
that it stands independently of personal artistic or psychological
inclinations may be too extreme. Zimmer, for example, asserts
that Nabokov’s “concern with mimicry was not a poet’s
whim” (Zimmer, 50). Brian Boyd provides an inverted formulation
of the same sentiment by attempting to set aside Nabokov’s
metaphysical viewpoint: “Although the possibility of a metamorphosis
beyond death had everything to do with Nabokov’s art, it
bore little relation to his science” (Boyd, 21). Both remarks
attempt to separate Nabokov’s scientific and artistic beliefs;
Nabokov’s body of literary work, however, suggests that
there was in fact much shared ground between the two. Robert Pyle
and Charles Remington arrive at more reasonable conclusions regarding
Nabokov’s resistance to natural selection:
Perhaps
because the subterfuges of mimicry so resembled his own favorite
tools as a literary trickster, Nabokov was loath to consign
their wonderment to strictly mechanical causes…Remington
believes it was Nabokov’s ‘strong metaphysical investment
in his challenge to selection’ that made him unsatisfied
with a Darwinian explanation (Pyle, 65).
It seems that
Nabokov’s view of nature and its governing mechanisms was
not merely a formal intellectual stance, but rather lay at the
heart of his conception of life and art. Natural selection’s
challenge to the existing model was similarly fundamental, which
may explain in part the vigor with which Nabokov (a specialist
in morphology, not population genetics) attempted to attack it.
One may thus identify several correlations between themes in Nabokov’s
literature and the ideas employed in his refutation of Darwinism,
parallels which should provide a stronger understanding of not
only Nabokov’s rejection of natural selection, but also
the general mindset with which he approached his scientific and
artistic work.
The first theme
addressed herein concerns mimicry and deception, which Nabokov
identifies as definitive proof against Darwin but also employs
as a familiar trope in his fiction. Zimmer notes the extensive
historical use of mimetic phenomena as a test for natural selection
before proposing that by evoking mimicry, Nabokov is likewise
“aiming right at the heart of Darwinism” (Zimmer,
51). Yet while such phenomena may be particularly conducive to
the anti-Darwinian argument, the ubiquity of the mimetic motif
in Nabokov’s literature indicates an interest that is more
than purely scientific. Explicit mention is often made in passing;
in Ada, for example, the eponymous takes great pleasure in reproducing
a “marvelous flower that simulated a bright moth than in
turn simulated a scarab” (Ada, 100). Subtler and more expansive
applications of mimetic deception, however, may also be cited.
In Pnin, a fundamental shift occurs when the protagonist is relieved
of his burden of ridiculous cliché and revealed to be a
psychologically intricate individual. One might reasonably argue
that this transition is the novel’s crux, in which case
its central conceit is the reader’s sudden awareness of
Pnin’s emotional depth. This effect vividly recalls Nabokov’s
description of “the stab of wonder that accompanies the
precise moment when, gazing at a tangle of twigs and leaves, one
suddenly realizes that what had seemed a natural component of
that tangle is a marvelously disguised insect or bird” (Speak,
Memory, 298). Pnin’s initial, banal exterior may thus be
seen to correspond to a mimetic disguise, the artful authorial
concealment of the protagonist’s autonomous reality. This
apparent embedment of mimicry in Nabokov’s literature inevitably
gives the notion some artistic valence.
The idea of non-utilitarianism,
which directly applies to Nabokov’s view of nature as unguided
by selective pressure, is also quite palpable in his art. Nabokov
himself notes the connection: “I discovered in nature the
nonutilitarian delights that I sought in art. Both were a form
of magic, both were a game of intricate enchantment and deception”
(Speak, Memory, 125). Both explicit and implicit illustrations
of this theme are available. For instance, motifs in certain novels
– specifically, the oblong puddles of Bend Sinister and
recurrent squirrels in Pnin – seem to serve as little more
than ambient adornment and authorial signatures. This reading
is promoted by the significant role Nabokov accords himself, as
creator and participant, in both narratives; his presence and
influence are overt and subtly reinforced by means of this understated
and otherwise ‘nonutilitarian’ patterning. He writes
in the Introduction to Bend Sinister that the puddle, fittingly
shaped like a “footprint,” “vaguely evokes in
him [the protagonist] my [Nabokov’s] link with him: a rent
in his world leading to another world of tenderness, brightness
and beauty” (Bend Sinister, xv). These patterns echo Nabokov’s
rationalization of detail in nature as a breadcrumb trail deliberately
left by the good-humored artist.
More oblique strains
of non-utilitarianism may be seen to typify Nabokov’s fiction
as well. In Ada, for example, the evolutionary necessity of procreation
is twice flouted by the novel’s central romance between
siblings: incest is openly associated with “various forms
of decline,” and Van is literally sterile (Ada, 133). The
“lovely and larveless” couple spends life pursuing
personal pleasure, ignoring any potential obligation (especially
incumbent, one could argue, on such superlative specimens of humanity)
to produce offspring (Ada, 95). Nabokov also incorporates non-utilitarianism
into his characterization of worthwhile art, whose composition
and appreciation, he suggests, rest on seemingly insignificant
details: “these footnotes in the volume of life are the
highest forms of consciousness” (Lectures on Literature,
374). Such sentiments intrinsically emphasize the view of natural
detail as the primary locus of non-utilitarian aesthetic satisfaction.
The simultaneous
entrenchment of these themes in Nabokov’s science and art,
as suggested by their relative significance in both contexts,
provides a primary link between his refutation of natural selection
and his distinctly non-scientific concerns. The remaining three
themes to be considered – order, immortality, and enchantment
– are relevant in a more extrapolative sense, tied to Nabokov’s
science in that they are made possible by his personal conception
of nature. Correspondingly, each may be seen as somewhat excluded
by the Darwinian model and may thus suggest specific reasons for
Nabokov’s anti-Darwinian stance.
The first of these,
order, is perhaps the one most commonly associated with a conceptual
aversion to natural selection. The heavy emphasis Darwinism places
on chance comes in stark opposition with an often inherent faith
in deliberate action; in adopting Darwinian logic one is forced
to recognize that nature is governed by hazard and by consequence
fundamentally unpredictable. The notion, in its proscription of
the underlying design and agency that one hopes to discover outside
oneself, may therefore lead to psychological discomfort. Nabokov’s
novels, of course, are uniformly characterized by meticulous planning
and supreme control: “the design of my novel is fixed in
my imagination and every character follows the course I imagine
for him. I am the perfect dictator in that private world insofar
as I alone am responsible for its stability and truth” (Strong
Opinions, 69). The experience is by no means universal. For certain
writers it is just the opposite: their fictional creatures, by
sheer strength of character, seem to determine for themselves
what happens in the novel. One might associate this latter scenario
with natural selection in that the shaping forces are, in both
cases, internally situated. Nabokov harshly condemns this view,
calling such writers “very minor or insane” (Strong
Opinions, 69). One might thus rationalize Nabokov’s refutation
of Darwinism as a comparable denial of feeble or senseless natural
governance.
Nabokov’s
particular vision of nature also offers some unspoken resistance
against the certainty of mortality. The potential subversion of
death by means of an unconventional afterlife is another common
theme in his fiction. The protagonist of Bend Sinister, for example,
is finally saved from impending doom by an act on Nabokov’s
part of narrative dissolution; the fictional world is terminated
as convoluted proof of the fact that “death was but a question
of style” (Bend Sinister, 241). Similarly in Ada the theme
of Terra, a putative sister-planet to the novel’s Antiterra,
is interpreted by some as a postmortem destination. In his autobiography,
Nabokov frequently alludes to a personal struggle with mortality
by describing ideal circumstances under which the passage of time
is transcended: “nothing will ever change, nobody with ever
die” (Speak, Memory, 77). This impulse may be tied to Nabokov’s
anti-Darwinism for the simple reason that the hypothesized ‘contrapuntal
genius of human fate’ would support the possibility of some
form of eternal life. Notably, Nabokov was consistently opposed
to organized religion; he was also, however, undeniably concerned
with the problem of death. One might therefore contend that his
skepticism of Darwinism was fostered, on some level, as a knee-jerk
defense of the prospect of immortality.
Finally, one may
consider the theme of wonderment in Nabokov’s literature
in possible connection with his anti-Darwinian position. While
it is difficult to concretely identify the evocation of wonder
in any given novel, Nabokov exalts the capacity to do so as the
definitive measure of a successful practitioner: “it is
the enchanter in him that predominates and makes him a major writer”
(Lectures on Literature, 5). This same enchantment, he suggests,
may be found in nature, and indeed seems to be the primary motivation
behind Nabokov’s scientific pursuits: “The tactile
delights of precise delineation, the silent paradise of the camera
lucida…represent the artistic side of the thrill which accumulation
of new knowledge, absolutely useless to the layman, gives its
first begetter” (Strong Opinions, 79). One may detect an
undercurrent of sadness in Nabokov’s personal writing regarding
the latent transience of certain manifestations of this magic:
“it was most satisfying to make out among the jumbled angles
of roofs and walls, a splendid ship’s funnel…as something
in a scrambled picture – Find What the Sailor Has Hidden
– that the finder cannot unsee once it has been seen”
(Speak, Memory, 310). This particular ‘stab of wonder’
is irreversible and tragically irretrievable. Natural observation,
however, is apparently a source of more lasting amazement, a sort
of never-ending game in which, as Nabokov hints in Bend Sinister,
“the glory of God is to hide a thing, and the glory of man
is to find it” (Bend Sinister, 106). A recurrently enfeebling
portrayal of the ultimate power of science suggests his belief
that natural enchantment is inexhaustible: “I don’t
believe that any science today has pierced any mystery…the
situation remains as hopeless as ever. We shall never know the
origin of life, or the meaning of life, or the nature of space
and time, or the nature of nature” (Strong Opinions, 44-45).
One might argue,
then, that natural selection poses a threat to wonderment in that
it attempts to explain life’s workings too logically and
completely. If correct, Darwinism would cause the supposedly everlasting
spring of inspiration to be found in the natural world to run
dry. In arguing for the artistic importance of irrational considerations,
Nabokov asserts, “Blood may well be the Silurian sea in
our veins, and we are all ready to accept evolution at least as
a model formula…But again it is one thing to try and find
the links and steps of life, and it is quite another to try and
understand what life and the phenomenon of inspiration really
are” (Lectures on Literature, 378). One might see this investigative
dichotomy as corresponding to the related tasks of Nabokov’s
science and art, respectively. It is possible, then, Nabokov viewed
Darwinism’s attempt to answer a latter-type question (that
is, ‘what life really is’) as leaving the realm of
practicable empirical argument. Perhaps Nabokov retained the hope
(or belief) that natural enchantment was inherently impervious
to the sort of definitive exposition that the theory of natural
selection attempted.
While the above
correlations and justifications may be seen as increasingly speculative,
they do seem to signify, as a group, Nabokov’s deep-seated
attachment to a specific conception of nature that is directly
threatened by Darwinian theory. His investment in his own model,
while not empirically groundless, appears to far exceed the traditional
scope of scientific conviction. Ideas of mimicry, non-utilitarianism,
order, immortality and wonder all carry significant aesthetic
or emotive weight for Nabokov while at the same time bearing relevance
to his scientific arguments. These thematic links suggest that
Nabokov’s scientific and artistic views may be inextricable.
Empirical justification aside, Nabokov’s refutation of Darwinism
seems at least partially attributable to pre-existing aesthetic
inclinations
This conclusion
is not surprising in light of Nabokov’s own articulation
of the intimate relationship between art and science. Although
at times he seems to attempt a partition – by saying for
example that butterfly hunting and writing “belong essentially
to quite different types of enjoyment” – he more often
suggests that he is conscious of his own tendency to bridge the
two pursuits (Strong Opinions, 39-40). In reviewing a collection
of entomological illustrations, Nabokov posits the existence of
“a high ridge where the mountainside of ‘scientific’
knowledge joins the opposite slope of ‘artistic’ imagination”
(Strong Opinions, 330). Such a ridge would likely seem to Nabokov
an ideal place to establish intellectual camp. Similar integrative
sentiment is found in Ada: “how passionately, how incandescently,
how incestuously…art and science meet in an insect, in a
thrush, in a thistle of that ducal bouquet” (Ada, 436).
For Nabokov, the intersection of the two seems to be effortless.
He embraces “the free interchange of terminology between
any branch of science and any raceme of art”; one might
suggest that it is a small leap from this point to the intermingling
of larger guiding principles (Strong Opinions, 79).
In light of the
proposed synthetic ideology, it may be worthwhile to reconsider
the tendency of commentators to defend Nabokov’s work as
a scientist. Zimmer, like Boyd and Pyle, stresses the point that
“Nabokov’s rejection of Darwinism in no way impeded
or tainted his scientific work as a taxonomist” (Zimmer,
43). On a basic level the claim is undeniably true; Nabokov’s
contribution to lepidopteral systematics was real and significant
(Pyle, 58). In a more theoretical sense, however, the extent to
which his approach to science is directed by artistic impulses
may give one pause. The idea is reinforced by Nabokov’s
identification of personal gratification as the central motivation
and goal of the scientific enterprise: “keen pleasure…what
else should the pursuit of science produce?” (Speak, Memory,
298). Additionally, Nabokov often reiterates a philosophy of self-isolation
with regard to his pursuits: “I don’t give a damn
for the group, the community, the masses, and so forth”
(Strong Opinions, 33). While the “ivory tower” where
Nabokov advises writers to reside may be useful in artistic endeavors,
its benefit to a scientist is less obvious – yet there Nabokov
apparently remains (Lectures on Literature, 371). Conventional
perceptions of science are closely tied to ideas of collective
understanding and reason accompanied but uncolored by emotion.
One might thus argue that Nabokov’s artistic inclinations
do influence his scientific legacy in that they necessitate qualification:
at the broadest levels, his science appears to be guided by an
intensely personal perspective. The effect is not necessarily
diminishing; the relative merit and ultimate distinction of Nabokov’s
particular brand of science are certainly up for debate. Nonetheless,
one feels compelled to individuate his work along these lines.
Boyd, Pyle and
Zimmer all address the question of whether Nabokov, if privy to
the full burden of proof now available in support of natural selection,
would accept the Darwinian model as true. The general consensus
is affirmative. Perhaps the next question to ask is how this conversion,
by forcing a complete overhaul of Nabokov’s natural views,
could have shaped his later fiction. Nabokov’s artistic
precepts and staple themes are of course compelling enough to
stand on their own, but one wonders to what extent a gloss of
Darwinian utilitarianism might have altered the author’s
basic literary sensibilities.
Works Cited
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Butterflies. Eds. Brian Boyd and Robert M. Pyle. Boston: Beacon
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Nabokov, Vladimir.
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The Gift. Trans. Michael Scammell and Vladimir Nabokov. London:
G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1963.
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“Between Climb and Cloud: Nabokov among the Lepidopterists.”
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Robert M. Pyle. Boston: Beacon Press, 2000.
Zimmer, Dieter
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