~This Issue's Index~

Belgrade to Beijing:
A Trump Card in Chinese Political Strategy

By Nebojsa Spaic

In a stunning breach of Yugoslavia's diplomatic isolation, a Chinese delegation recently attended the annual congress of the Serbian Radical Party. The Radical Party, headed by Serbian Vice-President Vojislav Seslj, is a coalition partner of President Slobodon Milosevic's ruling Socialist Party of Serbia. The convention, typified by outbursts of firebrand rhetoric against Western institutions and American military aggression, met enthusiastic applause when Seslj praised the strengthening Chinese-Serbian alliance. The special relationship between China and Serbia, marked by extensive economic and political assistance to Serbia, has been crucial to Yugoslavia's survival and Milosevic's regime, while reflecting China's growing insecurity in its often-uneasy coexistence with the United States.

Nowhere does the new friendship between China and Serbia come to light as strongly as in surburban Belgrade, where traditional neighborhoods are being transformed into virtual Chinatowns. Chinese businessmen and diplomats are flocking to the city, new Chinese restaurants are opening every week, and Chinese vendors and companies have filled empty shopping centers and office blocks. Given Serbia's depressed economy, this sudden revival in entrepeneurship has been a blessing. Jobs, imported consumer goods, and investments are slowly flowing back into Belgrade's beleaguered markets after years of deprivation. Plans for future commercial ties remain certain, with over five hundred Chinese citizens applying for Yugoslav residency permits every month.
This stunning entente was sealed by last year's NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. As former diplomat and international policy analyst Zivorad Kovacevic notes, "In order to understand the nature of special relations with China, one should not be guided by ideology, since it is the factor of least importance. If we are talking about the most recent period, we must bear in mind the consequences of NATO's bombing of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] on China itself. Despite the country's strong opposition in the Security Council, an action was undertaken which included the bombing of its own embassy, ending in the death of three Chinese officials. Moreover, this happened precisely on the tenth anniversary of Tiananmen. Beijing had to divert the attention of the public, and focused on the fact that the US had to apologize. Cynical as this may sound, that was a welcome diversion."

However, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy played only a small role in the two nations' warming diplomatic ties, which have deeper roots. In the current international environment, the Chinese government is actively seeking to balance American power and domination. Its new role in Serbia is merely a part of China's effort to oppose the hegemony of the United States. In other words, Yugoslavia has become a trump card in the diplomatic battles and strategies between the world powers. Naturally, where direct Chinese interests are concerned, the card of Belgrade is traded for another.

Serbia's survival instincts

Belgrade knows how to charge for the points China had scored in its diplomatic quarrels, and not only in political terms. The winter, feared by all in Serbia-especially in light of international sanctions, as well as the rickety power system damaged in last year's bombing-came and passed with few consequences. Thanks to Chinese economic aid, there were sufficient supplies of electricity, as well as of oil and gas.
Although this has not been officially confirmed, it is common knowledge that China extended a sum of $300 million to Yugoslavia immediately before the winter, in the form of an extremely soft credit arrangement combined with a barter deal. The source of the cash, suspected by some to be Serbian hard currencies stashed abroad before the war, remains unclear. A similar deal bailed out Yugoslavia several years ago at the height of the international embargo, though applied more strictly than the current one. Back then, Chinese oil reached Yugoslav consumers in return for tractors, which were of inferior quality and rejected by Beijing. The outstanding debt proved to be no obstacle for the new $300 million deal, however, which bought another year of social stability for Serbia.

With the new Chinese funds quickly spent, Borka Vucic-one-time mentor of Milosevic and a leading banking official in the government-made another trip to Beijing. "There will be no devaluation of the dinar if Borka has once again brought sufficient money from Beijing," a source high up in the banking circles reports, while another adds that "it all depends on how large the concealed cargo space the plane has for Borka to hide the money, lest the IMF sees it." Serbia's international sanctions prohibit the inflow of external funds, and China, being heavily dependent on international capital, has had to find less conspicuous ways not to disturb world financial markets. As a result, the details of the agreement were not disclosed to the domestic public or media.

New ties, old roots

Close relations between China and Yugoslavia were established in the early 1990s, when Mira Markovic-Milosevic's wife and President of the pro-communist Union of the Yugoslav Left, one of Milosevic's coalition partners-led a Yugoslav delegation to China, intending to find partners and mutual understanding in Beijing. Ever since, the Yugoslav Left has been a leading supporter of the Chinese model of communism, which survived the 1989 Tiananmen crisis.

As the influence of the Yugoslav Left on the Serbian bureaucracy increases, so does its ideology, says Predrag Simic, an associate of the respected Belgrade Institute for International Politics and Economy. "The ideological element is also visible on the Chinese side," observes Simic. "It is no accident that the policy of special relations with Belgrade is supported by the conservative hard line in the Communist Party of China, led by Li Peng." For the Chinese, however, political interests rather than ideology underpin its special relations with Serbia. Not only does China oppose American hegemony worldwide, but China is also seeking to reduce international interference in its domestic affairs. China is concerned that the bombing and isolation of Yugoslavia, arising from a largely internal issue, will turn into a precedent for the West, jeopardizing the PRC's interests in Tibet, Taiwan, and even Mongolia.

NATO's bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade only underscored China's concerns, as few believe the event to have occurred by chance. NATO's claim that the error was due to its use of an old city plan strikes hollow, as the Embassy had been constructed on an empty plot of land. A second suggestion, that NATO missed while targeting a state arms export firm, makes equally little sense. The firm's building is located about 500 meters away, and NATO missiles are targeted with great precision. Furthermore, the American press reported that the strategic bombers attacking the Embassy had taken off from airports in the United States, without informing the NATO headquarters in Brussels. Explanations for the bombing vary. Some say that Milosevic had been hiding in the Chinese Embassy, or that Yugoslav authorities were allowed use of the aerial mounted on the Embassy's roof. Others believe that the Pentagon merely took the opportunity to send Beijing a message that China is still weaker than America, especially as the event coincided with the spread of the Chinese spy affair in the US.

Propaganda psychology

The psychological effects of the bombing were huge. The Chinese began to consider the policy of normalized relations with Belgrade on an emotional level. A Yugoslav commercial representative in China at that time sent out a euphoric text on mass e-mail, regarding the fierce demonstrations of the Chinese in front of the American embassy. The message came complete with his assessment that the Chinese are difficult to stir, but become a power impossible to arrest once roused. On the other side of the world, local propaganda proclaimed that Serbia felt the loss of Chinese lives more acutely than the death of any other local civilian victim of the bombing.

The "pro-Chinese" doctrine will succeed as much as any other segment of the Milosevic regime's propaganda campaign, says Dragoljub Petrovic, a public opinion researcher. In his words, "people who are averse to the West and are susceptible to the complete ideological and promotional activity of the regime, find it easy to accept the claims of closeness with the Chinese, who will help us fend off the impending economic, social, and political collapse."
However, while Chinese support has clearly extended prospects for Serbia's survival, most Serbians remain unaware of the risks involved with such high-stakes power games. For one thing, the new alliance has done little to improve Yugoslavia's standing in the international community, especially in Europe. More alarmingly, as Petrovic notes, most Yugoslavs, including those in the government, don't realize "that the Chinese are using us primarily to pursue their international interests and consider those interests foremost, and that they would be ready to give us up whenever it suited them."