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The Real Losers of Locke v. Davey
Joshua Davey
On February 25, I lost a case before the
Supreme Court of the United States. It was the final word in a
lawsuit I filed over four years earlier, and the end to my legal challenge
of a
Washington state law that prohibits state college scholarship funds
from going to students majoring in theology. I was not just any plaintiff,
however;
I may be the first person in the history of Harvard Law School
to have been party to a Supreme Court case while a student. As Harvard
Law Professor
Charles Ogletree noted, it is difficult to be the first of anything
at the law school, and my participation in the case has made for an
interesting
and unique first-year law school experience.
But
as disappointing as the loss was to me personally, and as much
as I had hoped to
win and believed
in my cause, I am convinced that I am not
the real loser of Locke v. Davey. Certainly, I was the losing party,
and at seven justices to two, the vote was one-sided. And there
is no doubt
that the personal cost was substantial. I gave up nearly $3000 in
scholarship money on principle; the court’s decision in February means I will
never see any of that money. Despite this, however, one could fairly argue
that things did not turn out so bad for me. I still graduated college with
honors. Indeed, I am now studying at Harvard Law School, and will likely
have countless opportunities available to me upon graduation. So the loss
of the Washington Promise Scholarship hardly seems to have ruined my future;
indeed, inasmuch as this case helped me decide to pursue a legal education
in the first place, one might say that despite the outcome I have come
out ahead. But this is not true of everyone who had a stake in the outcome
of my case. When the Supreme Court failed to take a stand against religious
discrimination by requiring Washington State to treat all its citizens— even
its religious ones— equally, many people lost much more than I did.
The story of my case began in 1999, when as a senior in high school I
was awarded a Washington Promise Scholarship, available to all Washington
students who qualified on the basis of academic merit and financial need.
The scholarship was to last two years, could be used at any accredited
school in Washington, and was worth the cost of an average community college
tuition in the state of Washington. I had long intended to pursue a career
in the ministry, and with this in mind, I enrolled at Northwest College
in Kirkland, Washington, declaring a major in theology. I would use the
funds from the scholarship to help me achieve my educational and career
goal.
In
October of my freshman year, I encountered a major obstacle to
my plan; the
financial
aid director
of my college informed me that I was not eligible
to receive the Promise Scholarship funds because I had chosen to
major in theology. Washington’s constitution, like those of over
thirty other states, prohibits the appropriation of any public
funds for religious
instruction. This left me with a choice: change my major and keep
the scholarship, or forego the scholarship in order to keep my
major. I chose the latter.
I had come to college to prepare for a career in the ministry, and
to change my major simply to receive the scholarship would have
been wrong. Instead,
I sued the governor and a number of state education officials for
violation of my constitutional rights of free speech, free exercise
of religion,
and equal protection under the laws. While I lost in federal district
court, I won on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, whose judgment was
reversed by the
Supreme Court in their recent decision.
The
Supreme Court’s decision was not merely a loss for me, but also
for anyone who cares about the religious freedom our Constitution was designed
to protect, which has now been seriously eroded by Davey. Indeed, the protection
of individual religious liberty was a major motivating factor behind the
First Amendment, which provides that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” These two clauses are two sides of the same coin; the establishment
clause prohibits the government from impinging upon free exercise,
while the free exercise clause demands there be no government-sponsored
religious
establishment. The result of the interplay of these two clauses should
be a government which acts neutrally toward religion, favoring no
one religious group over another, nor non-religion over religion.
Under this interpretation, states like Washington would be free to establish
public benefits programs like the Promise Scholarship and determine the
criteria for participation. States could require that the scholarship only
be used at public schools, or they could limit the scholarship to specific
majors (e.g., nursing, education, engineering) that it has an interest
in encouraging people to study. But if states choose to make the scholarship
generally available, qualified persons should not be rejected on religious
grounds. States should not be permitted to discriminate between religion
and non-religion, among various religions, or among various sects of one
religion. This sort of religious discrimination exhibits not neutrality,
but hostility toward religion. It is to single out religious individuals
and institutions for disfavorable treatment.
After
the Supreme Court’s
decision two years ago in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, it is clear
that it is constitutionally permissible for states to establish
these sorts of religion-neutral benefit programs. In Zelman, the
constitutionality of a Cleveland school voucher program was challenged
by several groups
claiming that the inclusion of religious and parochial schools in
the program was unconstitutional. Clearly, taxpayer funds were
routed to religious
schools as part of the program; the vast majority of the private
schools that participated were religious. Despite this, the Supreme
Court ruled
the program constitutional in what has been rightly called the most
important education decision since Brown v. Board of Education (1).
Crucial to the constitutionality of the program is the private
choice involved. The tax money that
ultimately finds it way to religious and parochial schools as part
of this kind of
voucher program does not travel directly from the state to the religious
institution—which would be unconstitutional—but rather passes
through the hands of the parents first. It is the parents, after
receiving a voucher, who make the decision as to whether it will
go to a secular
or religious school. Thus, Zelman is a perfect example of indirect
government funding of religious organizations and institutions, a
type of funding
that is perfectly constitutional.
It
is my position that such indirect funding of religious individuals
or
institutions
in public
benefit programs is not only constitutionally
permissible, but constitutionally required where the benefit program
is generally available based upon religion-neutral criteria. This
was my contention
in Davey, though it was not upheld by the court’s decision. This
is the view, however, that comports with most people’s sense of fairness;
it just does not seem right that individuals should be excluded from
government benefit programs because of their religious affiliation (2). It is also a view
that comports well with case law, which has repeatedly rejected religion
as an appropriate basis for government discrimination in a wide variety
of contexts (3).
Many individuals, however,
do not it see it this way; rather, they believe that the establishment
clause requires the government to engage in active
discrimination against religion, and that failing to do so amounts
to establishment (4). Under this analysis, the
guiding principle behind church-state relations
is not neutrality or fairness, but rather active disfavoring of religion
by the government. One popular argument in favor of this view is
that it is unjust to require taxpayers to fund any religious activity
with which
they might disagree, even if that funding is indirect. Indeed, this
was the primary justification given by the State of Washington
in my case for
its law preventing any state scholarship funds from going to students
majoring in theology. The problem with this argument is that if
we are to embrace
it as a starting point in deciding what sorts of activities ought
to be funded by the state, we are left with very little to guide
us. If I am
Roman Catholic, I might object to the inclusion of contraceptives
in the health plans of state employees, which are of course paid
for by taxpayer
funds. If I am Muslim, I might object to state-run liquor stores.
If I am an observant Jew, I might object to the state conducting
any business
on Saturdays. If I am an evangelical Christian, I might object to
the secularism that is embodied in public education in the United
States. And if I am
a libertarian, I might object to there being much of a government
at all. The point of each of these examples, of course, is that
the state engages
in all kinds of activities with which some taxpayers disagree, despite
the sincerely held objections of those taxpayers. There is simply
no way for the state to be sensitive to the consciences of its
taxpayers such
that none of them is forced to pay for a program with which he or
she does not agree. Indeed, any efforts to enact a system of taxation
in which taxpayers could allocate their tax funds based on conscience
would doubtlessly end
in disaster. In order for the state to function, taxpayers surely
cannot be exempted from paying taxes simply because they disapprove
of some of
the ways those funds are spent.
Logically, then, one would
expect that those who advocate active governmental disfavoring
of religious individuals and organizations would likewise be
opposed to federal financial aid programs, including Stafford Loans,
the GI Bill, and Pell Grants (5). To be consistent, they would
have to demand that
government employees not devote their salaries to any religious purposes,
as these salaries are paid by taxpayers (6). It is impossible for
me to see how there is any meaningful difference between a scholarship
going to a
student wishing to study theology or a voucher going to a parent
who wants to send their child to a parochial school and a government
employee who
faithfully contributes to his or her church, synagogue, mosque, or
other religious organization. In each of these cases, taxpayer
funds go to religious
individuals or organizations indirectly, channeled through individuals
who have discretion over how those funds are used.
Thus, it would seem that unless one is willing to commit to the idea
that the state must curtail the liberty of its employees such that they
cannot commit any of their taxpayer-funded salary to religious purposes,
one must reject the notion that the state ought to engage in active disfavoring
of religion in order to comply with the Establishment Clause. Quite the
contrary, it would seem that in order to ensure equality and prevent the
state from intruding on the liberties of its citizens in the name of preventing
establishment, a policy of equal treatment ought to be adopted. Zelman has already told us that such an equality regime is constitutional; Davey tells us that it remains optional. So who loses, then, under Davey? Religious
individuals and religious organizations. Because states are permitted to
engage in active disfavoring of such persons and institutions in the name
of protecting taxpayer conscience, religion is a basis upon which states
may engage in discrimination sanctioned by the law.
Perhaps
the biggest losers after this decision are America’s schoolchildren,
and insofar as these individuals represent the future of this country,
the nation itself. Public education in the United States is in a
serious state of decline. Especially among minority groups, dropout
rates remain
high and graduation rates unsatisfactorily low. Students in the United
States consistently perform worse then their counterparts in other
industrialized countries in math and science (7). This is despite
the fact that, in the past
twenty years, annual per-student expenditures have increased some
forty percent, and total educational expenditures some sixty percent
(8). That the
public schools of this nation are failing ought to be obvious to
anyone who has attended one; I myself was educated entirely in
public schools,
and recognize many deficiencies in my own education. Competition
introduced through parental choice and school voucher programs
will almost certainly
improve this situation. By giving parents a choice in deciding which
schools their children will attend, failing public schools will
be forced to improve
or suffer a decline in enrollment and consequently funding.
Who
would benefit from this kind of state-sponsored, religion-neutral
public benefits
program? Religious families, certainly. While many
religious parents already elect to send their children to private
schools for reasons
of faith or conscience, parental choice programs would incentivize
such choices. Rather than allocating religious parents’ educational
tax dollars for public education from which their children receive
no benefit, such programs would permit the taxes that parents already
pay in
support
of education to go toward the education of their own children. Middle
class families would certainly benefit from such a parental choice
program as
well. Many such families already engage in “school choice” by
choosing to live in neighborhoods with good public schools (9). A
parental choice or voucher program would lessen the need to move
and thus the competition for housing in those few neighborhoods lucky enough
to have a good public
school. It would make choosing a private school an economically viable
choice for many of these families. And the competition such programs
create would serve to increase the quality of all the schools involved,
making
relocation on the basis of school quality alone unnecessary.
The class
of families who would most benefit from school choice programs,
however, are those with low incomes, many of which belong to minority
racial or ethnic groups. These families often lack the financial
resources necessary to relocate to more expensive neighborhoods
with better schools,
as well as the time, education, and finances necessary to home-school
their children (10). The result of this dilemma is that these
parents have no choice but to send their children to the local
public school,
which, in low-income areas, is often a failing one. Thus, these
children will
not have the educational opportunities afforded those lucky enough
to attend better schools. This educational disadvantage translates
into
lower paying careers, higher rates of incarceration, and higher
rates
of familial dissolution among the children of these parents,
thereby perpetuating the problem. The solution to this cycle, in
which the children of low-income families are educationally disadvantaged
and often become
low-income parents themselves, is parental choice in education
supported by some sort of voucher program. Such a program would
have tremendous potential to eliminate the lingering ill effects
of the
many
historical
injustices perpetrated against minority racial and ethnic groups.
Again,
under Zelman, such a program is clearly constitutional. If I
had won in Davey,
these programs
would have been far easier to establish in
many states, because those states would not have been permitted to
exclude religious schools from participating in school choice programs.
Unfortunately,
no school choice program is likely to succeed if religious schools
are denied participation; the fact is that there are few non-religious
private
schools. Any voucher program which excludes religious schools is
far too limited to achieve its purpose, and limiting such a program
to public schools
would fail to introduce the competition that is necessary to improve
the quality of education in all our schools. The big losers of
Davey, then,
are those who stand to benefit from parental choice and school vouchers
in states which currently prohibit and taxpayer funds from going—even
indirectly—toward religious education.
If
parental choice and school voucher programs are poised to revitalize
primary
education
in
the United States, why do so many states retain a
rule prohibiting the appropriation of any tax funds for religious
education, when under Zelman such a rule is clearly not required
by the Federal Constitution?
One important reason is that teacher’s unions, which have a strong
incentive to preserve the status quo, are well funded, well organized,
and politically influential (11). These unions,
and the politicians and school boards they control, are essentially
the “education establishment,” and
enjoy what amounts to a virtual monopoly over education in the United
States (12).
Furthermore, this establishment
enjoys statutory or constitutional backing in many states in the
form of Blaine Amendments. These laws, adopted in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries as anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant
measures, expressly prohibit any state funding of religious education,
whether direct or indirect (13). It was Washington’s
Blaine Amendment that prevented me from receiving the Promise Scholarship;
forty-seven
states in total have Blaine Amendments or similar provisions in their
constitutions or statutes (14). In many of these states, parental
choice and school
voucher
programs face tremendous legal obstacles because of the these anti-religious
laws.
While
Davey had the potential to seriously weaken or even eliminate
the Blaine Amendments,
the Court’s opinion unfortunately leaves them
intact. Legal challenges to these discriminatory laws will now have to
continue state-by-state, both through litigation and constitutional amendment.
These legal challenges have great promise of success, but will not have
the benefit of a national precedent clearly rejecting religious discrimination
in public benefits programs. Accordingly, it is clear to me that even though
I lost before the Supreme Court of the United States in Locke v. Davey,
I am not the biggest loser in this case. Those who really lost are those
whose religious freedoms have been eroded, and those whose educational
opportunities will suffer because of the Court’s sanctioning of ongoing
religious discrimination.
1. Clint Bolick, Voucher Wars 189
(Cato Institute 2003).
2. See Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment is Not Establishment,
13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 341, 346 (1999).
3. See
Id. at 367-71 (discussing the Supreme Court’s repeated rejection
of religion as a basis for excluding individuals and institutions from
generally available
government programs under Free Speech, Free Exercise, Establishment,
and Equal Protection clauses).
4.
See Id. at 342.
5.
Id.
6.
See Id. at 342-43.
7. See David Salisbury and Myron Lieberman, Keeping the
Nation at Risk,
at http://www.cato.org/research/articles/
salisbury-030425.html (Mar.
14, 2004).
8.
Adjusted for inflation. See Id.
9.
Marie Gryphon and Emily A.
Meyer, Our History of Educational Freedom: What It Should Mean for
Families Today, Cato Policy Analysis No. 492, 14 (2003), at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa492.pdf (Mar. 14, 2004).
10.
Id.
11.
See Bolick, supra note 1, at xiii-xiv.
12.
Id. at xiv.
13.
Gryphon and Meyer, supra note 9, at 15.
14.
Bolick, supra note 1, at 204 n.5.
Joshua
Davey is a first-year student at Harvard Law School.
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